Search results

To date, the validity of the empirical tests that employ the mean‐variance approach for testing the risk‐return relationship in the research stream named Bowman’s paradox is inherently unverifiable, and the results cannot be generalized. However, this problem can be solved by developing an econometric model with two fundamental characteristics: first, the use of a time‐series model for each firm, avoiding the traditional cross‐sectional analysis; and, second, the estimation of a model with a single variable (firm’s rate of return), whose expectation and variance are mathematically related according to behavioral theories, forming a heteroskedastic model similar to GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity). The application of this methodology for Bowman’s paradox is new, and its main advantage is that it solves the previous criticism of the lack of identification. With this model, we achieve results that agree with behavioral theories and show that these theories can also be carried out with market measures.

Profiting from a unique research opportunity in the Portuguese REIFs market, this paper aims to investigate the impact of fund managers ' accounting choice on funds ' returns distribution and analyses the relationship between fair value accounting choice and conditional accounting conservatism.

According to Portuguese securities market regulation, fund managers of REIFs can fix the value of the fund properties between the acquisition cost and the average of the appraisal values assigned periodically by two independent appraisers. Therefore, through the analysis of fund managers’ actual choice to value REIF net asset value in comparison with a mandatory adoption of a pure fair value method (appraisers’ valuations), the paper investigates the impact of accounting choice on funds’ return series. On the other hand, an analysis at fund level is also conducted to determine the consequences of fair value accounting choice on the ability of fund managers in delaying the recognition of asset value decreases (bad news).

Results indicate that in the period of financial crisis, significant differences in REIF returns according to the accounting method used to value properties are observed. There is also evidence that fund managers of open-end funds that are subject to greater market pressure to meet financial reporting objectives are more likely to smooth book value returns. Additionally, findings support the hypothesis that REIFs that use a more historical cost accounting model exhibit a lower degree of conditional accounting conservatism, suggesting that the use of fair value may be useful to reduce fund manager discretion in delaying the recognition of losses.

This paper provides an empirical evidence of one possible positive effect of the use of fair value on the quality of financial reporting, evidencing how a more fair value accounting model may limit fund managers’ discretion.